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Abstract
This Article is broken into five sections. Part I defines political risk. Part II provides a brief
review of the academic literature showing the work that has been done in this area of law. Part
III argues that there have indeed been oscillations in the degree of political investment risk in the
world and explains that investment risks rise when changes in the world power structure cause tem-
porary power vacuums. Once new institutions emerge for the protection of investments, the level
of risk declines. Part IV discusses the current trend, in which the world is witnessing the emer-
gence of a new institutional design for the protection of investments: A network of international
legal institutions, and bilateral and multilateral treaties. Part V revisits the literature, showing that
the results of previous scholarly studies support the theory of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1690, John Locke wrote that in the absence of govern-
ment, personal property rights are not well secured.' The "great
and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths,
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of
their property."2 However, while a government can offer protec-
tion for property rights as between its own subjects, its ability to
guarantee that property will be free from governmental interfer-
ence is far more limited.
One example of the risk to property posed by governments
appeared in The Guardian on Dec. 12, 2006:
Shell is being forced by the Russian government to hand over
its controlling stake in the world's biggest liquefied gas pro-
ject .... The Russian authorities are also threatening BP
over alleged environmental violations on a Siberian field in
what is seen as a wider attempt to seize back assets handed
over to foreign companies when energy prices were low.3
Many in the international community were skeptical of the
purported environmental concerns, and wondered if these inci-
dents signaled a broader policy shift toward expropriation of for-
eign investments.4 Dmitry Peskov, Russian President Vladimir
Putin's spokesman, also stated that Russia wanted to encourage
western investment and closer links with countries in Western
Europe.5 However, this desire to increase foreign investment
* Associate, Haynes and Boone, LLP in the Corporate and Finance sections. I wish
to thank N. Meyer Zohn, Esq. for comments and support. All errors, of course, are
mine.
1. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 123 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
2. Id. § 124.
3. Terry Macalister & Tom Parfitt, $20bn Gas Project Seized By Russia, TFIE GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED (U.K.), Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,
1970064,00.html.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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may be impaired if investors see these actions as expropriatory.
On the other hand, too much deference to foreign investors may
hamper implementation of domestic policies, such as environ-
mental protection.
The degree of scholarly effort devoted to discovering how
governments make decisions regarding the expropriation of for-
eign investments has varied over time. While many works were
published in the 1930s, the 1970s, and over the past decade, the
periods of research have been interspersed with periods of si-
lence. Logically, we would expect that interest would be driven
by the level of risk, and, while we do not have data from before
the 1970s, this seems to be true from the 1970s until the early
1990s.6 This Article seeks to answer two questions: (1) does the
level of political risk in the world oscillate; and (2) if so, what
causes the oscillations?
This Article is broken into five sections. Part I defines politi-
cal risk. Part II provides a brief review of the academic literature
showing the work that has been done in this area of law. Part III
argues that there have indeed been oscillations in the degree of
political investment risk in the world and explains that invest-
ment risks rise when changes in the world power structure cause
temporary power vacuums. Once new institutions emerge for
the protection of investments, the level of risk declines. Part IV
discusses the current trend, in which the world is witnessing the
emergence of a new institutional design for the protection of
investments: A network of international legal institutions, and
bilateral and multilateral treaties. Part V revisits the literature,
showing that the results of previous scholarly studies support the
theory of this Article.
I. WHAT IS POLITICAL RISK?
Before we can accurately assess political risk, we must define
it. Scholars, analysts, courts, and government agencies have
struggled to agree on an exact definition of political risk or to
determine when a government is responsible for losses caused by
political sources.7 Almost any definition may be problematic be-
6. See Michael S. Minor, The Demise of Expropriation as an LDC Policy, 1980-1992, 25
J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 177, 184 (1994).
7. See Llewellyn D. Howell, Defining and Operationalizing Political Risk, in POLITICAL
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cause government involvement or acquiescence could be
blamed for nearly any investment loss.
In this piece, I define political risk as those acts that ad-
versely affect investments and for which the government of the
host country is considered legally responsible under interna-
tional law. To characterize legal responsibility, I reference U.S.
takings laws, bilateral investment treaties, and other sources of
international law. Using these laws to describe political risk has
two benefits: (1) these definitions are highly developed; and (2)
they have real world significance. International laws may actu-
ally shape the behavior of governments because of consequences
specified in those laws.
U.S. laws regarding takings are important because interna-
tional law has already borrowed heavily from U.S. law and this
practice may be expected to continue. The Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution states that the government will not deprive
citizens of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"
and that private property shall not "be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation."' Identifying a taking is straightforward
where a government assumes physical possession and ousts a pri-
vate owner. However, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a taking need not
include actual physical invasion of the property, but could also
arise from economic regulation.' The Court noted that com-
pensation cannot be awarded for every taking, such as those
done through taxes or routine regulation, since this would dis-
rupt proper government functions.10 Important considerations
include whether there has been a physical invasion of the prop-
erty, the impact on the property owner, and the impact on inves-
tor expectations."
From this foundation, there has been substantial legal cross-
fertilization. Often times, investors contractually specify that
U.S. law will govern in the case of a dispute. In addition, tribu-
nals may apply U.S. law because they are most familiar with it.
For example, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the "Tri-
RISK ASSESSMENT: CONCEPT, METHOD, AND MANAGEMENT 3 (Llewellyn D. Howell ed.,
2001).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
9. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
10. See id.
11. See id.
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bunal") has used definitions of expropriation substantially bor-
rowed from U.S. Takings Clause jurisprudence. 12
A. Types of Takings Risks That Are Generally Protected Under
International Law
In the international legal framework, the U.S. Model Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty ("U.S. Model BIT") probably contains the
most well developed rules regarding takings. It seeks to protect
investors against expropriation, creeping expropriation, cur-
rency inconvertibility, and discriminatory property protection. 13
The U.S. Model BIT allows expropriation only if it is: (1) for a
public purpose; (2) done in a non-discriminatory manner; (3)
promptly, adequately, and effectively compensated at the fair
market price as of the date of expropriation, and the compensa-
tion includes the interest that would have been earned on the
money since expropriation; and (4) done with due process of
law. t
4
Expropriations form a substantial portion of the takings
that occur. There are several types of expropriations distin-
guished by subtle differences. Nationalization is the taking of all
foreign investment or all foreign investment in certain indus-
tries, usually as part of a social or economic reform program.' 5
Confiscation is the taking of property without compensation.' 6
Creeping expropriation occurs when a government takes action
with the intent to erode the investment's value, perhaps by im-
posing regulations that raise operating costs, increase tax bur-
dens, require the slow transfer of ownership to a local counter-
part, or require government appointment of managers.' 7 Even-
tually, these actions cause the investment to become
unprofitable and the investor may sell the property, often at a
heavy discount, to the government."8
12. See, e.g., Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 163
(1983).
13. See U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 6 (2004), http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/TradeSectors/Investment/Model_BIT/assetupload-file847_6897.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 15, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
14. See id.
15. See PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVEST-
MENr UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 6 (1997).
16. See id. at 7.
17. See id. at 8-9.
18. See id.
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Inability to access the cash proceeds generated by an invest-
ment is another common form of taking. The most common
type of problem in this category is inconvertibility. The U.S.
Model BIT states: "Each Party shall permit transfers relating to a
covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and
out of its territory. '"19 These transfers include contributions to
capital, profits, dividends, proceeds from whole or partial sale of
the investment, interest, royalty payments, management fees,
technical assistance fees, payments made under contracts, pay-
ments on loans, payments made by the government as compen-
sation for expropriation, and payments in compensation for dis-
putes. 20 Transfers must be allowed to occur in a freely ex-
changeable currency. 21 However, the U.S. Model BIT allows
countries to prevent transfers when done to assist law enforce-
ment in civil awards and criminal penalties. 22 A less typical ex-
ample of interference with the cash proceeds of an investment
occurred in Harza Engineering Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran.23
There, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal found that a tak-
ing occurred because of the government's unreasonable inter-
ference with the use of a bank account.
24
Takings also occur when governments fail to provide ade-
quate property protection. The U.S. Model BIT states: "Each
Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accor-
dance with customary international law, including fair and equi-
table treatment and full protection and security. '2 It defines
full protection and security as the "level of police protection cus-
tomary under international law."' 26 Variations in the level of po-
lice protection in different countries do not necessarily indicate
variations in the level of political risk. However, if police system-
atically fail to protect foreign-owned facilities, such inaction
19. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. 7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Harza Eng'g Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 499, 504
(1981).
24. Id. at 504; see also George H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of
Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 606
(1994).
25. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. 5.
26. Id.
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might indicate a policy of discrimination against foreign inves-
tors.
Property may also face inadequate protection in dispute res-
olution processes. The U.S. Model BIT requirement that inves-
tors receive "fair and equitable treatment" from host state gov-
ernments includes access to judicial process.27 If we find that
foreign investors are unable to access fair and enforceable dis-
pute resolution, and especially if they face discrimination in the
domestic courts, then these investors face a political risk.
Having set out the basic definition of a taking in interna-
tional law, it is now important to explore the ambiguities. There
are two potential sources of ambiguity in determining whether
the government has taken property. First, is the government the
relevant actor? Second, was there a true "taking" or merely per-
missible regulation?
1. The Government as Relevant Actor
There can be no governmental taking where the govern-
ment is not responsible for the taking.28 Therefore, the takers
must be governmental authorities or agents of the govern-
ment.29 The Tribunal in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran found that the government was legally responsible for
losses only if "there was deliberate governmental interference
... the effect of which was to deprive Sea-Land of the use and
benefit of the investment.""0 In Schering Corp. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, Schering alleged that a taking had occurred when the
Islamic Worker's Council forced a local manager to sign an
agreement giving the workers a veto power over all payments the
subsidiary made. 1 However, the Tribunal found that the Islamic
Worker's Council was not acting pursuant to any governmental
order; therefore, the government was not responsible.3"
Questions regarding government responsibility tend to arise
most often in the context of inadequate or discriminatory prop-
27. Id.
28. See Aldrich, supra note 24, at 598-99.
29. Id.
30. Sea Land Serv. Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 149,
166 (1984); see also COM.AUX & KINSELLA, supra note 15, at 16.
31. See Schering Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 361,
362-63 (1984); see also Aldrich, supra note 24, at 602.
32. Schering, 5 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 368.
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erty protection. For example, in Autopista Concesionada de Vene-
zuela v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Autopista built a highway
and had an agreement with the government that it would recoup
the costs through tolls.13 However, after the highway was built,
motorists refused to pay and drove through the tolls.34 Because
the National Guard stood back and refused to intervene, the In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("IC-
SID") arbitral tribunal found that the government of Venezuela
was liable for the losses because of discriminatory property pro-
tection.35
With respect to political violence, some losses are consid-
ered to be government caused and others not. In addition,
there can be confusion because political insurance corporations,
such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"),
routinely include civil war, rebellion, rioting, terrorism, and any
other politically motivated violence that causes damage to facili-
ties, injures employees, or causes interruption in the production
and sale of goods.3 6 However, when losses from politically moti-
vated violence are not caused by the government, there is gener-
ally no right to compensation under international law.3 7 For ex-
ample, a U.S. company owned and operated a rubber plantation
in Liberia. A civil war ensued in Liberia and rebels took control
of the plantation and destroyed it." Since the investor was
OPIC-insured, it was compensated even though the loss was not
caused by the government. 9
However, there are other circumstances in which a govern-
ment might be legally responsible for the political violence of
non-governmental actors. In American Manufacturing and Trad-
ing, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, the company alleged that its facilities
in Kinshasa had been looted on two occasions and that the gov-
ernment had failed to provide the protection required under
33. Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
No. ARB/00/5 (ICSID Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/Award_
Total.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See OPIC, Political Violence, http://www.opic.gov/insurance/coverage/vio-
lence/index.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
37. See Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 156 (1983).
38. See OPIC Claim filed under Contract of Insurance No. C423, Keene Industries,
Inc. Liberia (Dec. 7, 1990), Award on March 21, 1991.
39. See id.
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the bilateral investment treaty ("BIT").40 The tribunal found
that the government had violated the minimum standard of
treatment because of its inadequate protection.4'
2. Expropriation vs. Permissible Regulation
As in U.S. law, the line between permissible regulation and
expropriation is difficult to draw. Courts and tribunals are very
reluctant to find that regulations constitute expropriations be-
cause this would severely limit the rights of a sovereign to exer-
cise its ordinary police powers.42 Any inquiry is also likely to
cease if it appears that the regulation is non-discriminatory.43
However, even this inquiry is very cursory since it could require
the tribunal to analyze the motives of the state in enacting the
legislation, which can be difficult to discern and may also be
seen as a lack of respect for a state's sovereignty.44
Tribunals tend to have no difficulty finding expropriations
in those cases where the government passed a law explicitly
transferring ownership from foreign owned enterprises.45 For
example, the Iranian government passed a law in 1979 that na-
tionalized all insurance companies.46 Another clear example of
a direct expropriation is the Cuban government's legal action in
1960 to take the property of U.S. nationals. The law read:
In pursuance of the powers vested in us, in accordance with
the provisions of Law No. 851, of July 6, 1960, we hereby,
RESOLVE:
FIRST: To order the nationalization, through compulsory ex-
propriation, and, therefore, the adjudication in fee simple to
the Cuban State, of all the property and enterprises located in
the national territory, and the rights and interests resulting
from the exploitation of such property and enterprises,
owned by the juridical persons who are nationals of the
United States of North America, or operators of enterprises
40. American Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, 36 I.L.M. 1534, 1535
(1997).
41. Id. at 1549.
42. See Michael G. Parisi, Moving Toward Transparency? An Examination of Regulatay
Takings in International Law, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 383, 397-99 (2005).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 24, at 587.
46. See id.
20071
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in which nationals of said country have a predominating in-
terest, as listed below. 4 7
Creeping expropriations can be more difficult to identify,
but heavy interference with the management of a business tends
to be construed as expropriatory. For example, in Starrett Hous-
ing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Claims Tribunal decided
that the temporary appointment of Iranian managers had inter-
fered with the claimant's ownership rights to such an extent that
the rights had lost substantially all value.41 In addition, in Tip-
petts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, the Tribunal
found that a taking had occurred primarily due to the actions of
the government-appointed manager, rather than the appoint-
ment itself.49 There, the manager refused to respond to commu-
nications from the Tippets headquarters.5 ° The Tribunal stated:
While the assumption of control over property by a govern-
ment does not automatically and immediately justify a conclu-
sion that the property has been taken by the government,
thus requiring compensation under international law, such a
conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that
the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership
and it appears that this deprivation was not merely ephem-
eral. The intent of the government is less important than the
effects of the measure on the owner, and the form of the
measures of control or interference is less important than the
reality of their impact.51
Where creeping expropriation is done through regulations,
the regulations may appear to be ordinary exercises of a state's
police power to promote the health, safety, and well-being of its
citizens.52 The U.S. Model BIT recognizes that regulations may
sometimes be improperly regarded as expropriations when they
are actually legitimate exercises of a state's police powers. To
encourage the protection of certain interests that might be con-
sidered especially sensitive, it designates areas of law in which
47. Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122,
154-55 (1983).
49. See Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
219, 226 (1986); Aldrich, supra note 24, at 589.
50. See Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 226.
51. Id. at 225-26.
52. See Parisi, supra note 42, at 388-90.
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sovereign regulation should receive special deference. These in-
clude environmental laws, labor laws, national security, and reg-
ulation of the financial services industry.5
3
However, even exercises of police powers in these areas may
not be upheld if they appear to be post-hoc justification for ex-
propriation. For example, in Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican
States, Metalclad began construction of a waste disposal facility
after receiving assurances from the governor and other state offi-
cials that all of the permits were in order and the site was suita-
ble for hazardous waste disposal 4.5  Metalclad completed con-
struction in 1995; however, demonstrators protested the open-
ing of the facility and Mexican troops blocked access to it,
preventing it from opening. 55 The government then sought sev-
eral additional concessions to which Metalclad agreed, including
designation of thirty-four hectares of Metalclad's site for protec-
tion of certain species, Metalclad's contribution of two new pesos
per ton of waste toward local social works, a ten percent discount
for waste disposal from that state, and provision of free medical
care for local inhabitants for one day per week.56 After operat-
ing for thirteen months, the local municipal authority told
Metalclad it needed a permit from the municipality to continue
operations, and the municipality refused to grant such a per-
mit.5 7 The state governor also issued an Ecological Decree,
designating the area of the landfill as an ecological preserve for
58
rare cacti.
The tribunal found that the state's actions were clearly not
based on environmental concerns, but were motivated by politi-
cal factors.59 Furthermore, the Mexican authorities had not fol-
lowed Mexican law and procedures when refusing to allow con-
tinued operations. The tribunal determined that refusing a per-
53. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, arts. 12, 13, 18, 20.
54. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INVEST. L. J. 168, 179-81
(2001).
55. See id. at 182.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 183.
58. See id. at 189. When Metalclad initiated proceedings pursuant to NAFTA,
Mexico agreed that it was responsible for any illegal actions of the state and local gov-
ernments under the state responsibility rule of the International Law Commission of
the United Nations in 1975. Id. at 189.
59. See Metalclad Corp., 16 ICSID REv. FOREIGN INvsr. L.J. at 190.
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mit for environmental reasons was a subject matter beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipality.6" Furthermore, the denial of
the permit was done at a Municipal Town Council meeting of
which Metalclad had not been given notice or an opportunity to
appear." Because of these circumstances, the tribunal did not
defer to the state's right to regulate, even though the regulations
pertained to the environment, which is widely regarded as a sen-
sitive area.
B. Other Definitions
While I use the legal takings definitions, the reader should
be aware that there is no consensus on the definition and that
other scholars and entities have defined political risk differently.
The government agency, OPIC, defines political risk as loss re-
sulting from political violence, expropriation, or currency incon-
vertibility.6 2 The Political Risk Services and International Coun-
try Risk Guide ("ICRG"), defines political risk as the risk of prop-
erty loss from government acts, and provides a list of political
risk components that it believes may contribute to inconvertibil-
ity, expropriation, civil strife, and negative government actions.6 3
Political risk is also defined in many ways in the scholarly
literature. Fitzpatrick divides the literature into four categories.
The first category defines political risk as the risk of government
interference.64 The second category defines it in terms of occur-
rences of political events and acts, including political violence,
even if not caused by the government.65 The third category ana-
lyzes risk in terms of the overall political environment.66 The
fourth category considers political risk to be a generalized coun-
try risk.67 Some scholars define political risk as risk from politi-
cal sources exclusive of commercial risks.6" Other scholars di-
vide risk into macroeconomic risk, which affects all economic
60. See id. at 192.
61. See id. at 193.
62. See OPIC, Insurance, http://www.opic.gov/Insurance/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2007).
63. Howell, supra note 7, at 14.
64. Mark Fitzpatrick, The Definition and Assessment of Political Risk in International
Business: A Review of the Literature, 8 ACAD. OF MGMT REV. 249, 249 (1983).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 250.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., D.A. Jodice, Trends in Political Risk Assessment: Prospects for the Future, in
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actors in the economy, and microeconomic risk, which affects
only particular actors or industries.69
Although others have defined political risk differently, I be-
lieve that there are important advantages in using legal defini-
tions from U.S. and international law. These include: (1) gov-
ernments are held accountable only for the choices they make
and not the independent actions of third parties; and (2) inter-
national law itself may deter governments from engaging in the
proscribed acts.
II. QUESTIONS DISCUSSED IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE
This Section summarizes the research that has been done
on political risk thus far, demonstrating that there is a gap in the
literature regarding how forces external to host countries affect
risk. Some scholars have focused on the effects of political risk.
Some have analyzed host country incentives. Finally, some have
studied policy instability at levels short of a taking. Authors in
business schools have been fascinated by political risk. They
have shown that political risk increases interest rates,7° that bad
political news affects exchange rates more than good news,71
that risk increases currency fluctuations, 72 depresses stock premi-
ums,7 3 often increases necessary project returns, 7  and stimulates
capital flight,75 even from the home country.
76
Authors have also discussed methods of mitigating political
risk. Boyacigiller discusses the "right" proportion of expatriate
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT: NEW DIMENSIONS, 8-26 (Fariborz Ghadar
& Theodore H. Moran eds., 1984).
69. See, e.g., JANICE MONTI-BELKAOUI & AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, THE NATURE, ESTI-
MATION, AND MANAGEMENT OF POLITICAL RISK 86 (1998).
70. See Michael P. Dooley & Peter Isard, Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Interest
Rate Parity, 88J. POL. ECON. 370, 370 (1980).
71. See Jean-Claude Cosset & Bruno Doutriaux de la Rianderie, Political Risk and
Foreign Exchange Rates: An Efficient Markets Approach, 16J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 21, 21 (1985).
72. SeeJennifer M. Oetzel, Richard A. Bettis, & Marc Zenner, Country Risk Measures:
How Risky are They?, 36J. WORLD BUS. 128, 128-29 (2001).
73. See Warren Bailey & Y. Peter Chung, Exchange Rate Fluctuations, Political Risk,
and Stock Returns: Some Evidence from an Emerging Market, 30 J. OF FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 541, 541 (1995).
74. See Kirk C. Butler & Domingo Castelo Joaquin, A Note on Political Risk & the
Required Return on Foreign Direct Investment, 29J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 599, 602 (1998).
75. See Robert Lensink et. al., Capital Flight and Political Risk, 19J. INT'L MONEY AND
FIN. 73, 73 (2000).
76. See Stephen B. Tallman, Home Country Political Risk and Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States, 19J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 219, 220 (1988).
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managers in a host country based on cultural distances and per-
sonal risk to managers.77 Burgman, v8 Cosset & Suret,79 and But-
ler & Joaquin" suggest using cross-national diversification to
smooth political risks, reduce overall portfolio risk, reduce earn-
ings volatility, and reduce bankruptcy risk because cross-national
investment risks show greater orthogonality than domestic in-
vestment risks.
Authors have proposed various means for measuring politi-
cal risks. Bunn & Mustafaoglu propose constructing a measure
to track political events by looking back through newspapers to
see what circumstances preceded them, and predicting future
events based on the frequency of the precursors.8 1 Amariuta,
Rutenberg, & Staelin surveyed international Vice Presidents of
firms randomly chosen from Standard and Poor's index regard-
ing Eastern European political risks.82 Similarly, Chevalier &
Hirsch sent surveys to the 750 largest firms on the Fortune 500.83
Stephen Kobrin discusses methods of surveying experts, such as
the Delphi method, in which experts voice opinions, read the
opinions of other anonymous respondents, and modify their
opinions until a consensus is reached. 4
With respect to the causes of political risk, the early schol-
arly research on expropriation consisted of case studies on ex-
propriations in Mexico, Cuba, and Eastern Europe.85 Kobrin86
and Minor8 7 performed more extensive analysis using cross-na-
77. See Nakiye Boyacigiller, The Role of Expatriates in the Management of Independence,
Complexity, and Risk in Multinational Corporations, 21 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 357, 357 (1990).
78. See Todd A. Burgman, An Empirical Examination of Multinational Corporate Capi-
tal Structure, 27J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 563, 563 (1996).
79. SeeJean-Claude Cosset & Jean-Marc Suret, Political Risk and the Benefits of Inter-
national Portfolio Diversification, 26J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 301, 301 (1995).
80. See Butler & Joaquin, supra note 74, at 599.
81. See D.W. Bunn & M.M. Mustafaoglu, Forecasting Political Risk, 24 MGMT. Sci.
1557, 1557 (1978).
82. Ion Amariuta et. al., How American Executives Disagree About the Risks of Investing
in Eastern Europe, 22 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 138, 140 (1979).
83. See Alain Chevalier & George Hirsch, The Assessment of the Political Risk in the
Investment Decision, 32 J. OPERATIONAL RES. Soc'y 599, 605 (1981).
84. See StephenJ. Kobrin, A Review and Reconsideration, 10J. OF INT'L Bus. STUD. 67,
75-76 (1979).
85. See, e.g., WENDELL C. GOP-DON, THE EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROP-
ERTIY IN MEXICO 4 (Greenwood Press 1975) (1941).
86. See Stephen J. Kobrin, Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in IJDCs, 34 INT'L
ORG. 65, 69 (1980).
87. See Minor, supra note 6, at 184.
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tional data, and concluded that before about 1960, most forced
divestments were associated with massive upheaval and govern-
mental changes. Gordon88 and Kobrin89 explain that during this
early period, governments were motivated by considerations of
national sovereignty.
However, after 1960, expropriations became more targeted,
and, on average, mass expropriations accounted for only a small
minority of cases.90 To explain the expropriations in the later
period, Kobrin, Jodice, and Eaton & Gersovitz argue that a gov-
ernment, in an effort to gain control over major economic activ-
ity within its borders, will weigh the relative benefits of expropri-
ation versus regulation.9" Over time, the value of a given invest-
ment will decline because of factors such as the age of the
technology used.9 2 Simultaneously, the government may realize
that it cannot effectively control the enterprise through regula-
tion.93 In some cases, no amount of regulation will achieve the
government's objective because the industry has strategic signifi-
cance and must be totally controlled, not merely regulated. Na-
tional control may also be essential in industries that are essen-
tial to the economy. For example, if extractive industries domi-
nate an economy, foreign control could pose a security risk.94
Jodice and Ramamurti discuss the effect of colonial history
on expropriation. Contrary to his expectations regarding the ef-
fect of national sovereignty, Jodice found that expropriations
were less common where the home country was a country that
had previously controlled the host country, such as through col-
onization.9" Ramamurti writes that as least developed countries
("LDCs") became more confident in their independence, mul-
tinational corporations ("MNCs") may have seemed to pose less
of a threat to sovereignty.96 This was particularly true as LDCs
88. See GORDON, supra note 85, at 4.
89. See Kobrin, supra note 86, at 69.
90. See id.
91. See Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations
From Perfect Capital Mobility, 94 ECON. J. 16, 39 (1984); David A. Jodice, Sources of Change
in Third World Regimes for Foreign Direct Investment, 1968-1976, 34 INT'L ORG. 177, 185
(1980); Kobrin, supra note 86, at 69-70.
92. See Kobrin, supra note 86, at 70.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., id.
95. SeeJodice, supra note 91, at 185 (1980).
96. See Ravi Ramamurti, The Obsolescing 'Bargaining Model'? MNC-Host Country Rela-
tions Revisited, 32J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 23, 27 (2001).
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diversified their investments from home countries and devel-
oped their own local private sectors.9"
Jodice writes about the short term payoffs governments
would receive by either expropriating or not expropriating in
both economic and political terms. From the economic perspec-
tive, he found that a decline in the growth rate of the economy
makes expropriation more likely because of the increased need
for cash infusion.9" In addition, in industries with high profits
there is more temptation to expropriate.99 From a political per-
spective, Jodice found that increases in the amount of internal
protest, political unrest, and resentment of foreign corporations
are positively correlated with expropriation.' 00
Ramamurti argues that countries are less likely to expropri-
ate when they are heavily dependent on foreign aid.' LDCs
may also have become more needful of foreign direct investment
("FDI") because of the fall in aid from the United States. Aid as
a share of capital flows from developed to developing countries
fell during the 1980 to 1990 period by over twenty percent.'0 2
This led to an overall fall in capital flows. 10 3 Commercial bank
lending fell during the 1980s because of the banking crisis.'" 4
Ramamurti and Wells & Wint focus on the effects of overall
economic policy on expropriation, suggesting that changes in
LDC policy away from import-substitution to a more open-mar-
ket strategy explain the decline in mass expropriations. 10 5 Dur-
ing the 1988-1993 period, 43.4% of the FDI that flowed to transi-
tion economies was linked to privatization efforts." 6 With FDI
comprising a much larger share of capital inflows, developing
countries entered into a large number of bilateral investment
treaties, which they hoped would raise the amount of FDI flow-
ing to them. At the multilateral level, increased FDI access was
97. See id.
98. SeeJodice, supra note 91, at 199.
99. See id. at 201.
100. See id. at 203.
101. See Ramamurti, supra note 96, at 30.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 27; see also Louis T. WELLS, JR. & ALVIN G. WiNT, FOREIGN INV. ADVI-
SORY SERV., MARKETING A COUNTRY. PROMOTION AS A TOOL FOR ATTRACTING FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT I (Occasional Paper No. 20357) (2000).
106. See Ramamurti, supra note 96, at 32.
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exchanged by developing countries for bail-out money following
banking and currency crises.1 0 7
Kobrin, °8 Jodice,1 °9 and Minor l1 0 noted a marked decline
in expropriations after about 1980. In addition, Minor noted
that the trend appeared to be reversing as governments priva-
tized industries in the early 1990s that had previously been gov-
ernment run.11'
A different branch of literature has focused on explaining
policy changes of a more minor nature. This literature is impor-
tant because of the well recognized ambiguity between permissi-
ble regulation and creeping expropriation. Since it can be diffi-
cult to distinguish the two, much of the literature regarding reg-
ulatory stability is likely to be relevant to the political risk
discussion.
One of the most important arguments explaining minor
policy changes is that governments manipulate the economy
prior to elections in order to increase the chances of winning for
the incumbents. This theory was developed by Nordhaus,' 12
Cukierman & Meltzer," t3 Rogoff & Silbert," 4 and Rogoff," 15 with
mixed results. Alesina, Cohen, & Roubini find evidence of
looser economic and monetary policies before elections but
their results do not show corresponding actual economic ef-
fects. 16 Shultz argues that the political business cycle is affected
by the current needs of the party in power." 17 Where that party
is relatively certain to remain in power, it is less likely to attempt
107. See id. at 31.
108. See Kobrin, supra note 86, at 65.
109. SeeJodice, supra note 91, at 177.
110. See Minor, supra note 6, at 184.
111. See id.
112. See William D. Nordhaus, The Political Business Cycle, 43 REv. oF ECON. STUD.
169, 169 (1975).
113. See Alex Cukierman & Alan Meltzer, Errata [A Positive Theory of Discretionary
Policy, the Costs of Democratic Government and the Benefits of a Constitution], 25 ECON. IN-
QuiRY 367, 368 (1987).
114. See Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Silbert, Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles, 55
REV. OF ECON. STUD. 1, 1 (1988).
115. See Kenneth Rogoff, Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, 80 Am. ECON. REv. 21,
21 (1990).
116. See ALBERTO F. ALESINA, ET AL., NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES 1 (Working Paper No.
3830) (1991).
117. See Kenneth A. Shultz, The Politics of the Political Business Cycle, 25 BRIT. J. POL.
Sci. 79, 83 (1995).
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economic manipulations that it may have to pay for later. 18 Re-
gardless of whether the attempted economic manipulations actu-
ally result in economic benefit, the important result for the pur-
poses of this study is that governments make these attempts. It is
not relevant to investors whether their investments are beneficial
to the economy once taken, only that the investments are taken.
However, the effect on investments before elections is unclear
since two effects may occur in opposite directions. It is possible
that a government would increase adverse actions against for-
eign investors in order to give itself more wealth to disperse
before an election. However, it is also possible that governments
would be especially conservative because massive takings before
an election could cause capital flight from the country.
Other scholars focus on the ability of governments to
change policies due to their institutional structures. Mulas-
Granados writes about the ideological composition of a govern-
ment in determining fiscal policy adjustments.11 9 Perotti &
Kontopoulos argue that a higher number of parties in govern-
ment causes higher budget deficits. 2 ° Sundquist and Fiorina ar-
gue that divided government produces less significant legisla-
tion."' Tsebelis proposes the veto players theory which hypoth-
esizes that policy stability is positively related to the number of
players whose approval is necessary to effect change, the magni-
tude of policy preference differences among these players, and
the internal cohesion of each player. 122
While governments could attempt to increase policy stability
by changing their institutional structures, they are often reluc-
tant to do so. Clark & Hallerberg argue that incumbents are
reluctant to tie their own hands with tools such as central bank
independence and will structure changes in institutions that are
118. See id.
119. See Carlos Mulas-Granados, The Political and Economic Determinants of Budgetary
Consolidation in Europe, 1 EUR. POL. ECON. REV. 15, 15 (2003).
120. See Roberto Perotti & Yianos Kontopoulos, Fragmented Fiscal Policy, 86J. PUB.
ECON. 191, 192 (2002).
121. See James L. Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition
Government in the United States, 103 POL. ScL Q. 614, 626-30 (1988); MoRRIs P. FIORINA,
DIVIDED GOVEPNMEN r (1992).
122. See George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presiden-
tialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 289, 301
(1995).
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merely illusory. 2  Keefer and Stasavage note the reluctance of
countries to change their institutional structures to make the bu-
reaucracy and courts more independent since that imposes a fu-
ture constraint on the government. 124
While not focusing specifically on expropriation or other
political risks for which governments are legally considered lia-
ble, scholars have discussed how policy changes affect interna-
tional investment. North & Thomas argue that institutions were
crucial in post-war Europe for encouraging investment by mak-
ing it more difficult for governments to take actions adverse to
international investors. 125 MacIntyre applies veto player theory
to qualitatively study four East Asian economies, arguing that
while there is a risk of policy volatility when there are few veto
players, investors may also suffer a risk of policy rigidity when
governments are unable to respond to crises. 126
III. POLITICAL RISK LEVELS VARY WITH WORLD
POWER STRUCTURES
While the literature regarding country-specific political risks
is fairly well developed, the literature regarding world system
risks is not. This Section argues that the history of political risk
in investment indicates that risk levels tend to change in several
countries at once because of shifts in world power. For example,
when a foreign state has been exerting influence on several
countries at once, and then withdraws from all of them, the in-
vestment environment will become unstable. In the power vac-
uum, investment losses will rise.
In a Hobbesian world, people form and submit to govern-
ments to provide and enforce law that will protect their lives and
property. Hobbes writes that men need "a common power to
keep them all in awe" or else they will remain in a condition of
war.127 To avoid war, he writes that men must keep their cove-
123. See William Clark & Mark Hallerberg, Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and
Electorally-Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323, 341-42 (2000).
124. See PHILIP KEEFER & DAVID STASAVAGE, WORLD BANK DEV. GRoUP, BUREAU-
CRATIC DELEGATION AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: WHEN ARE INDEPENDENT CENTRAL
BANKS IRRELEVANT? 1 (1999).
125. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OP THE WESTERN
WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 155 (1973).
126. See Andrew MacIntyre, Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Cri-
sis in Southeast Asia, 55 INT'L ORG. 81, 81 (2001).
127. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (George Rutledge & Sons 1886) (1651).
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nants. However, he recognizes that this is not feasible without a
common power to ensure that the punishment for breaking a
covenant exceeds the benefit of breaking that covenant. 128
In international investment, there is no common power to
preserve a general state of peace and provide ultimate assurance
that agreements will be honored. However, the situation in
which there is no force with which to enforce agreements is not
sustainable. Kant wrote, "It is the spirit of commerce which can-
not co-exist with a state of war, and which sooner or later masters
each nation. ' 129 It is this unsustainability that causes people in
the Hobbesian world to form governments.
This Section shows that investors have sometimes overcome
the absence of a common power by developing systems of law
and, at times, administering that system without the benefit of
sovereign enforcement. However, because of the additional en-
forcement abilities that sovereigns possess, investors often seek
sovereign recourse. This Section traces the history of investment
protection, showing how international forces have exerted influ-
ence on host countries and, at times, controlled them in order
to protect foreign investors.
The discussion begins with the law merchant system that
first arose during the medieval period, lasting from the eleventh
to the sixteenth centuries.13 ° The system then waned from the
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries because home countries
engaged in colonial protection of investments.13 ' However,
when world wars crippled Europe, European countries could no
longer control their colonies. In the post-colonial world, inves-
tors again faced political risks for which their home state sover-
eigns were not able or not willing to intervene. Investors began
developing new methods of filling these gaps by developing in-
ternational arbitral institutions. After the Soviet Union lost its
grip on much of Eastern Europe, political risk increased yet
again, and efforts to create international institutions to aid in
128. See id. at 82.
129. C.I. CASTEL DE SAINT-PIERRE, SELECTIONS FROM THE SECOND EDITION OF THE
ABREGE DU PROJET DE PAIX PERPETUELLE 41 (H. Hale Bellot trans., Sweet & Maxwell,
Ltd. 1927) (1738).
130. See A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY. TRANSNA-
TIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 104 (2003); see also Charles
Kerr, The Origin and Development of the Law Merchant, 15 VA. L. REv. 350, 354 (1929).
131. See id. at 104.
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the protection of investments accelerated. During the period of
the 1990s, there was rapid proliferation of bilateral investment
treaties, treaties to foster international arbitration, and domestic
laws to encourage foreign direct investment. Therefore, the cur-
rent force exerting external control on host countries is a net-
work of legal rules and home country mechanisms for enforcing
those rules.
A. The Medieval Law Merchant
The first power vacuum examined herein occurred with the
decline of the Roman empire in the period before the creation
of the modern nation-state with the Peace of Westphalia. 3 2 The
medieval law merchant arose during the period of Roman impe-
rial decline. The modern era of nation-states created by the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was yet to commence. Shipping had
developed significantly and merchants were coming together
from different places, forming business relationships with re-
peated transactions. Through these repeated transactions with
merchants from all over Europe, common understandings of
business formed and became custom. 133
Although the primary threats to merchant property at this
time stemmed from other merchants instead of governments,
the complete lack of property protection and access to justice
would probably violate the U.S. Model BIT Article 5 require-
ments of "full protection and security" and "fair and equitable
treatment."'134 From a theoretical perspective, Frieden has ar-
gued that when investors invest abroad, an implied contractual
relationship forms between the investor and the host country,
whereby the host country assumes an obligation to protect the
investment.135
To deal with the lack of sovereign enforcement, medieval
merchants created their own courts to settle disputes, using cus-
tomary law derived from the law of nature. 36 These courts were
important in fostering trade because they provided remedies to
132. See generally Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 20
(1948).
133. See Kerr, supra note 130, at 350.
134. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. 5.
135. SeeJeffry A. Frieden, International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Inter-
pretation, 48 Lr'L ORG. 559, 564 (1994).
136. See Kerr, supra note 130, at 356.
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merchants trading within the merchant guilds and fairs that
were not otherwise available. 137 Even in England, where com-
mon law courts were available, merchants were allowed to pur-
sue remedies through the law merchant because these addi-
tional remedies encouraged trade. 3 " In fact, merchants often
preferred the law merchant because the provision of justice was
much faster, enabling them to make their trades and be on their
way to the next port. 39
The law merchant's ruling would ordinarily instruct one
party to pay damages to another. In a few jurisdictions, govern-
ments gave the law merchant authority to impose penalties such
as fines.14 ° However, in most jurisdictions, the law merchant had
no way to compel the parties to comply with the ruling. Instead,
if a party failed to comply, the penalty was a loss of reputation. 141
Other merchants would not trade with that merchant, resulting
in market exclusion, and potentially, bankruptcy. 4 2
The law merchant did not have unlimited authority, but
could often impose a sufficient penalty to gain compliance. By
providing a supervised forum, the law merchant turned individ-
ual transactions into long term business relationships. 43 This is
quite analogous to the single transaction versus repeated pris-
oner's dilemma game. For example, in a single transaction, a
grain seller and purchaser get no benefit if they do not choose
to trade with one another. They both benefit if they both per-
form as agreed. However, if the purchaser pays in counterfeit
money, the seller is worse off than if they had never made a deal.
In addition, if the seller's goods are spoiled, the purchaser is
worse off than if they had never made a deal. If they know that
they will never see one another again, and if neither will know
whether the other has transacted honestly until it is too late, they
are each better off cheating one another. Since each dealer un-
137. See CUTLER, supra note 130, at 138.
138. See Francis M. Burdick, What is the Law Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 470, 472
(1902).
139. See id.
140. See Kerr, supra note 130, at 364.
141. See JEROME T. BARRETr &JOSEPH P. BARRETr, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION: THE STORE OF A POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT 16-17
(2004).
142. See CUTLER, supra note 130, at 104.
143. See generally Paul Milgrom, et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade:
The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).
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derstands these incentives, they will decide not to make a deal in
the first place. If they could find a way to enforce the deal, then
they could transact, making them each better off.
In most cases, the repeated prisoner's dilemma solves this
problem by allowing the dealers to engage in a series of transac-
tions. By bargaining and performing under the shadow of the
future, the traders are often, but not always, better off perform-
ing honestly.144 If they do not perform honestly, the other
trader may refuse to make future deals, which is a consequence
of cheating that is costly for both parties.
The law merchant gave merchants a place to trade in which
everyone knew the reputation of everyone else. Ostracism by
other merchants meant that a merchant could no longer get the
benefits of trade if he cheated others. If the merchant dealt
honestly with others, he would expect to receive a benefit in sub-
sequent transactions. However, if he cheated, his expected re-
turn would be high in the current round and very low in subse-
quent rounds.'45
In this way, the law merchant system fostered the develop-
ment of laws with international application where no sovereign
was necessary and, oftentimes, no sovereign was available. How-
ever, with the creation of the system of sovereign states in the
Peace of Westphalia, the enforceability of contracts was no
longer totally dependent on repeated transactions, and
merchants came to prefer sovereign justice, discontinuing the
law merchant fairs.
B. The Rise of the Nation-State as Enforcer of International Contracts
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 created the modern system
of nation-states as the highest political authorities in the
world. 14 6 From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the
nation-states of Europe adopted the merchant laws into codes
and common law decisions, which came to be regarded as the
only definitive sources of law.14 7 The nation-state also became
an accepted, if not preferred, method of ensuring justice in com-
merce. Investors increasingly expected host country govern-
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See generally Gross, supra note 132, at 20.
147. See CUTLER, supra note 130, at 147-48.
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ments to provide a measure of protection. If host country gov-
ernments would not do so, then investors might turn to their
home country governments.
Samuel Pufendorf, writing in the year 1673, stated that it
would be just for people to go to war to preserve their prop-
erty. 148 The European nation-states turned to colonialism to
protect citizens who invested abroad.149 By taking control of the
host country, the colonizers eliminated the inter-jurisdictional
nature of the investment contracts." 0 The benefit to investors is
shown by the fact that investors tended to receive higher returns
on investments made in colonies belonging to their home coun-
tries. 15 1 Consequently, they tended to invest more in colonies
controlled by their home countries. 152 Where they did invest in
colonies of other powers, the investments tended to be in indus-
tries such as manufacturing which were more difficult to expro-
priate than primary production industries.1 53
European control of colonies in the Western Hemisphere
ended as colonies declared independence and culminated in
1823 when the United States announced the Monroe Doctrine,
whose purpose was to permanently end colonization in the West-
ern Hemisphere. 154 The United States, a relatively small and
weak state, was opposed to European powers reestablishing
themselves on its doorstep.1 55 This placed the European and
Latin American states in a Hobbesian state of war that was not
sustainable. With no alternative to the use of military force, the
Monroe Doctrine was only a guarantee of Latin American sover-
eignty while the United States was willing and able to provide
such a guarantee. However, the United States was not able to
provide this guarantee during its civil war. During this time, with
no one to stop them, the French used military control to enforce
148. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DuTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAw 168, (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne, trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1993) (1673).
149. SeeJeffry A. Frieden, International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Inter-
pretation, 48 INr'L ORG. 559, 559 (1994).
150. See id. at 564.
151. See id. at 575.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. SeeJames Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823), in 2
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 218-19 (J.D. Richard-
son ed., 1907).
155. See id.
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the claims of French citizens against the Mexican government. 116
After Mexico reestablished its independence, Mexico and
other Latin American states sought to deter such military actions
by adopting the Calvo Doctrine, which sought to prohibit for-
eign investors from seeking diplomatic aid from their home
countries. 57 Instead, investors would be confined to using rem-
edies available to domestic investors. 158 However, the European
powers were not always deterred by such policy pronounce-
ments, using military pressure to secure payments on public debt
in Venezuela in 1902,159 and threatening intervention in Haiti
and the Dominican Republic in 1915.60
Recognizing that this Hobbesian state of war was not sus-
tainable, the United States decided that the Monroe Doctrine
was not tenable as it stood. European investors demanded some
enforcement of their property rights, and, if the United States
did not want European militaries to enforce them, the United
States would have to provide enforcement. 6' This prompted
the announcement by the United States of the Roosevelt Corol-
lary to the Monroe Doctrine. It stated that the United States
would intervene in Latin American affairs when Latin American
governments failed to keep order and pay their obligations, par-
ticularly if such deficiencies were chronic.162 As a consequence,
in 1916, the United States intervened in the Dominican Repub-
lic, setting up a pro-American dictatorship to maintain stability
and protect foreign investment interests. 16
3
However, as the fighting of World War I consumed Europe,
the Roosevelt Corollary became unnecessary as a deterrent to
European aggression. With Europe significantly weakened, the
United States no longer needed the Roosevelt Corollary to keep
156. See R. Doak Bishop &James E. Etri, International Commercial Arbitration in
South America 11-2, (unpublished paper), available at http://www.kslaw.com/library/
pdf/bishop3.pdf.
157. See generallyJACKJ. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERI-
CAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 350 (1997).
158. See id.
159. See C.G. Fenwick, Has the Specter of Intervention Been Laid in Latin America?, 50
AM.J. INT'L LAW 636, 636 (1956).
160. See generally HAROLD MOLINEU, U.S. POLICY ToWARD LATIN AMERICA: FROM
REGIONALISM TO GLOBALISM 40 (1986).
161. See id.
162. See generally SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE U.S. 157-166
(1943); MOLINEU, supra note 160, at 40.
163. See MOLINEU, supra note 160, at 45.
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Europe out of the Western Hemisphere and the policy was for-
mally abandoned in 1936 when the United States agreed not to
intervene in the domestic affairs of Latin American states in the
Convention on Rights and Duties of States.' 64 This saw the be-
ginning of an era of mass expropriations as countries sought to
regain control over investments operated by nationals of their
former conquerors.
In essence, with Europe at war, the power formerly exerted
to protect foreign investments was absent, creating a power vac-
uum. While much scholarly effort has been devoted to diagnos-
ing host country risk factors, this change in risk was not gener-
ated internally in any particular host country. Instead, it was a
result of external shifts in the world power structure.
C. The Modern Era: Revival of the Law Merchant
As European power waned with continental warfare, inves-
tors sought other methods by which to protect investments.
First, a new law merchant began to fill the void left by the depar-
ture of sovereign military power as investors acted through pri-
vate organizations to develop investment laws and monitor sover-
eigns. The development and harmonization of international
commercial law began with the private organization of
merchants and continued with the involvement of nation-states.
For example, a private French association called the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), formed in the 1920s,
produced its first set of rules in 1936, and has continued devel-
oping international commercial rules and arbitrating disputes
under them.'6 5 The ICC, like the law merchant of medieval Eu-
rope, values merchant self-regulation.166 The ICC members are
corporations, business associations, law firms, chambers of com-
merce, and individuals.' 67
Merchants also formed courts of arbitration to administer
the rules they made. The London Court of Arbitration was
founded in the late nineteenth century. 1 6  The ICC Court of
164. See Fenwick, supra note 159, at 637.
165. See generally CUTLER, supra note 130, at 208.
166. See International Chamber of Commerce, What is ICC?, http://www.iccwbo.
org/id93/index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
167. See International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Membership, http://rvww.
iccwbo.org/id97/index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
168. See CUTLER, supra note 130, at 228.
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Arbitration formed in the 1920s, and the American Arbitration
Association formed in 1926.169 The ICC Court of Arbitration is
the most popular, and many regard it as the best equipped to
deal with different legal systems and levels of development. 170
Even though there is no stare decisis in arbitral decisions, arbi-
trators often cite previous arbitral cases. Cross-fertilization also
occurs when the same arbitrators are chosen for different panels
in different disputes, conducted under different treaties. 171
Governments joined in the process of harmonizing interna-
tional commercial law in the 1950s and 1960s. The Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
("New York Convention"), the most widely adopted convention
on arbitration, was created in 1958, and invited nations to agree
to enforce arbitral awards under certain conditions. 172 Thirteen
major regional conventions have been adopted since 1950.173
The Hague Conference on Private International Law attained
status as an international organization in 1955, although it be-
gan as an almost exclusively European regional organization.17 4
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") was created in 1966 to promote global, rather
than simply regional, harmonization of law.' 75 The challenge at
this time, according to Clive Schmitthoff, one of the leaders in
establishing UNCITRAL, was to design a system that would func-
tion well in a world of both free market and planned economies,
and countries in different stages of development.' 76 Also instru-
mental to the success of UNCITRAL was the participation of the
United States, which controlled a substantial amount of world
investment but had not actively participated in previous ef-
forts.17 7 Capital exporting nations also often write model bilat-
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin
America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INr'L L. 301, 309
(2004).
172. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
173. See generally Kluwer Law International, Arbitration Conventions, http://www.
kluwerarbitration.com/arbitration/toc.aspx?type=conventions (last visited Sept. 15,
2007).
174. See CUTLER, supra note 130, at 209-10.
175. See id. at 212.
176. See id. at 212.
177. See id. at 214.
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eral investment treaties to aid their foreign investors.1 78 The
widespread use of these model BITs has led to great uniformity
among international investment treaties. 7
9
During the Cold War, the world settled into a bipolar power
structure with the United States and the Soviet Union largely
dominating world affairs. Scholars noted that after about 1960,
the era of mass expropriations seemed at an end. Kobrin,"8 °
Jodice,"8' and Minor'8 2 noted a marked decline even in targeted
expropriations after about 1980.
D. Collapse of the Soviet Union
A new shift in the world power structure occurred in the
1990s and led to a surge in political risk. This shift was caused by
the fall of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the formation of
several new governments and increased investment opportuni-
ties in the Newly Independent States. However, these new op-
portunities were not immediately accompanied by any new and
stabilizing force. Unlike changes in risk in earlier periods, nu-
merical data are available to demonstrate that this shift oc-
curred.
I use two types of data to analyze the rise in political risk
during the 1990s. First, I use measures of actual risk, developed
from ICSID arbitral claims and OPIC claims. Second, I use mea-
sures of perceived political risk such as from expert surveys and
news coverage. These measures capture different things because
actual risk may not be perfectly perceived. Investors are more
likely to be affected by actual risk. However, host states are more
likely to be affected by how investors perceive risk levels. Where
perceived risk does not reflect actual risk, countries may be un-
fairly punished or rewarded.
In order to capture takings for which international law rec-
ognizes a right to compensation, it is necessary to look at awards
rendered under international law. ICSID provides arbitral facili-
ties for disputes between states and nationals of other states for
investment disputes. Therefore, the cases tend to be ones in
178. See Garcia, supra note 171, at 309.
179. See id.
180. See Kobrin, supra note 86, at 65.
181. SeeJodice, supra note 91, at 177.
182. See Minor, supra note 6, at 184.
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which the investor is claiming that the state has inflicted an in-
jury with respect to his property. Clearly, awards are not always
rendered in favor of the investor. However, the investor does
prevail a substantial amount of the time. By analyzing the pat-
tern of claims, we can assess the attributes of modern political
risk.
In contrast to decisions of many courts, arbitral decisions
are not always made public, causing problems in collecting data
from the decisions. While investor-State arbitration is sometimes
performed through methods other than ICSID arbitration, the
ICSID decisions are more publicly available. Importantly, even
where ICSID does not publish an opinion at the request of the
parties, it still lists the decision on its list of pending and com-
pleted cases, allowing us to know of missing data. In addition,
many of the opinions are published online or in different
volumes and journals. I started with the official opinions pub-
lished by ICSID and the sources that ICSID cites. However,
there were still many missing cases. Therefore, I searched for
news articles that referred to these cases to supplement the data.
While the articles might not give details of the award or proceed-
ings, they frequently would give a brief description of the dis-
pute, the industry, and the investor.
In addition, I obtained data from OPIC, which offers politi-
cal risk insurance to U.S. corporations for expropriations, cur-
rency inconvertibility, and political violence. Claims against
OPIC would tend to occur where the remedy through the inter-
national arbitral system is inadequate. For example, the remedy
could be inadequate where the country refuses to pay and has
insufficient assets outside its borders to satisfy the award. For
example, in the expropriation claim of MidAmerican Energy
Holdings Company, several of the claims submitted to OPIC
were based on the fact that the Indonesian government would
not pay the arbitral award.'" 3 The OPIC claim decision states
that an investor has a valid claim for compensation where the
investor obtains a valid, final arbitral award against the country,
183. See Memorandum of Determinations: Expropriation Claim of MidAmerican
Energy Holdings Company (former CalEnergy Company, Inc.), Contracts of Insurance
Nos. E374, E453, E527, and E759, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Nov.
1999), available at http://www.opic.gov/insurance/claims/report/documents/claim-
midamerican.pdf.
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and that the country fails to pay the award within ninety days."8 4
The tribunal cited the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law, which states that "a state may be responsible ... if, having
committed itself to a special forum for dispute settlement, such
as arbitration, it fails to honor such commitment; or if it fails to
carry out a judgment or award rendered by such domestic or
special forum."' 85 The tribunal also stated that Article II of the
New York Convention recognizes the importance of these provi-
sions and that each signatory, including Indonesia, was obligated
to support and enforce agreements to arbitrate, and that eco-
nomic crisis was no excuse for nonperformance under the
Treaty.18 6
I obtained data from the sources described in Table 1.
TABLE 1: SOURCES OF DATA
Variable Unit Source
OPIC Industry Number Developed by Author From OPIC Claims obtained
under FOIA
OPIC Taking Number Developed by Author From OPIC Claims obtained
Type under FOIA
OPIC Taking Current $US Developed by Author From OPIC Claims obtained
Value under FOIA
ICSID Industry Number Developed by Author From ICSID official sources and
Claims new reports of claims in ISCID arbitration
ICSID Taking Number Developed by Author From ICSID official sources and
Type new reports of claims in ISCID arbitration
Perceived (0-25) with Euromoney Magazine
Political Safety 25 the safest
Bilateral Number ICSID at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
Investment cases.htm; UNCTAD at http://www.unctad.org/
Treaties Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=2344&lang=1
GDP Per Constant World Development Indicators (World Bank) at http://
Capita 2000 $US web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATA
STATISTICS/0,,menuPK232599-pagePK64133170-
piPK.64133498-theSitePK.239419,00.html
GDP Growth % World Development Indicators (World Bank) at http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATA
STATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599-pagePK: 641331 7 0-pi
PKR64133498-theSitePK:239419,00.html
184. Id. at 4-5.
185. Id. at 5 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 712 cmt. h
(1999)).
186. Id.
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FDI % GDP % World Development Indicators (World Bank) at http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATA
STATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599~pagePK64133170-pi
PK64133498-theSitePK:239419,00.html
Regime Number of Polity IV Dataset at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/
Durability Years Since
Last Regime
Change
Level of (-10 to 10) Polity IV Dataset at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/
Democracy with 10 the
most
Democratic
Fuel Exports % World Development Indicators (World Bank) at http://
% GDP web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATA
STATISTICS/0,,menuPIR232599-pagePK.64133170-pi
PK64133498-theSitePK239419,00.html
Industry % % World Development Indicators (World Bank) at http://
GDP web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATA
STATISTICS/0,,menuPKL232599-pagePK-64133170-pi
PK64133498-theSitePK:239419,00.html
Agriculture % World Development Indicators (World Bank) at http://
Exports % web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATA
GDP STATISTICS/0,,menuPK232599-pagePK64133170-pi
PK64133498-theSitePK-239419,00.html
New York Number of Author Compiled Data based on information from the
Convention Signatories Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitraltexts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html
Arbitration Number of Author Compiled Data based on information from
Laws Laws Kluwer Law at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/
arbitration/arb/legislation/NationalLaws/
Notable FDI Number of Author Compiled Data based on information from the
Laws Laws World Investment Report (UNCTAD) at http://www.
unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=1465
OPIC Current $US Author Compiled Data based on information from
Coverage OPIC
Extended
OPIC policies Number Author Compiled Data based on information from
by industry OPIC
Exports % GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank) at http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATA
STATISTICS/0,,menuPK232599-pagePK641331 7 0-pi
PK64133498-theSitePK:239419,00.html
1. Risk Trends Apparent in the ICSID Data
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 show the evolution in ICSID claims
over time and the jump in claims during the 1990s. Figure 1
shows a plot of all ICSID claims between 1970 and 2004. The
number of claims escalates in the 1990s through 2004. Figure 2
shows a plot of ICSID claims falling short of expropriation.
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These claims tended to be for things such as discriminatory
treatment and contract disputes and appear to be fairly constant
over time. Figure 3 shows the number of non-creeping (abrupt)
expropriations. This figure shows that levels of abrupt expropri-
ations were high during the late 1970s and early 1980s, which is
a result that agrees with the Kobrin line of studies. After about
1980, the number drops off before rising dramatically after 1995.
Figure 4 shows the number of creeping expropriation claims
over time. While there were some claims in the 1970s, these
claims completely ceased during the 1980s before surging in the
1990s, and falling off somewhat in the new millennium. While
the rise in abrupt and creeping expropriation claims in the
1990s suggests that the risk of expropriation increased, it proba-
bly did not increase as dramatically as these figures would sug-
gest. With the increasing number of bilateral investment treaties
signed by countries, ICSID jurisdiction to hear these claims
would also increase. Therefore, the rise is not as dramatic as
these graphs would indicate. Figure 5 shows the total number of
claims divided by the number of bilateral investment treaties and
confirms that the claims fell during the 1980s and rose during
the 1990s, peaking in about 1996.
FIGURE 1: TOTAL ICSID CLAIMS
30
25
20
15 0
Total Number 10
of Claims
5 0 00 0 0 00
0 0 0o-oo- .000
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
These results indicate that there was not only an increased
interest in political risk in the mid-1990s, but there was actually
an increase in political risk. This means that scholars who
thought that the late 1970s and early 1980s signaled the end of
political risk were only witnessing the end of one phase of it.
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FIGURE 3: ICSID NON-CREEPING EXPROPRIATIONS
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FIGURE 2: ICS1D CLAIMS FOR LOSSES SHORT
OF EXPROPRIATION
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FIGURE 5: ICSID CLAIMS/NUMBER OF BITS
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2. Risk Trends Apparent in the OPIC Data
Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 show the incidence of all claims, ex-
propriation claims, inconvertibility claims, and political violence
claims, respectively, over time. Figure 7 confirms the Kobrin
conclusion that expropriations became very uncommon after
about 1985. However, between 1995 and 2000, there is a jump
in the number of expropriations. While there were not a huge
number of expropriations in any year, the return of expropria-
tions concentrated in a short period of time following a long
absence is still at least suggestive of an actual shift in the risk
trend.
FIGURE 6: TOTAL OPIC CLAIMS
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Figure 8 shows that before 1990, governments often pre-
vented investors from repatriating their profits or otherwise con-
verting currencies. In contrast to expropriation, inconvertibility
problems appear to have ceased and not returned. In stark con-
trast to both expropriation and inconvertibility claims, political
violence claims sharply increased during the early 1990s before
FILLING THE VOLD
dipping and then rising slightly again in 1996, before falling off
in the late 1990s.
Political violence was relatively rare in the 1980s. However,
it rose sharply in the early 1990s. After 1995, the level of vio-
lence appeared to subside.
FIGURE 7: OPIC EXPROPRIATIONS
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FIGURE 8: OPIC INCONVERTIBILITY CLAIMS
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FIGURE 9: OPIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE CLAIMS
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3. Trends in Perceived Risk
Because the Euromoney political risk perception data is
largely based on how countries rank relative to one another, it
cannot show trends in the level of overall perceived risk. There-
fore, in order to ascertain the levels of perceived risk in the
1990s, I examined the amount of media coverage regarding risk.
2007]
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The frequency of reporting shows how important political risk is
relative to other general business issues. Articles on political risk
automatically displace news on other topics.
As shown in Figure 10, reporting in the Economist about po-
litical risk was essentially non-existent before 1992. There were
no articles between 1980 and 1988. The almost complete lack of
reporting prior to 1992 followed by a somewhat regular presence
suggests that something changed around 1992, or perhaps a lit-
tle earlier, which made political risk much more of a business
concern.
FIGURE 10: POLITICAL RISK ARTICLES IN
THE ECONOMIST
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The results from Risk Management Magazine also suggest that
a significant change occurred in the early 1990's. Prior to 1990,
most years did not include a single article on political risk. Inter-
est rose over the next few years until, in 1996, Risk Management
devoted an entire issue to political risk. With the exception of
1996, reporting seems to have stabilized at about three or four
articles per year.
FIGURE 11: POLITICAL RISK ARTICLES IN
RISK MANAGEMENT
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E. Explaining the Surge
1. Regime Durability and Democracy
I believe that this surge can be explained by the dissolution
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of the Soviet Union in 1991, which radically altered the world
power structure. In this period, democracy greatly expanded
and the governments of the Newly Independent States were frag-
ile. Fortunately, for the 1990s period, we have numerical data
that we can use to test and support this hypothesis. Before con-
ducting the analysis, I expected that low regime durability in the
Newly Independent States would increase expropriations be-
cause host governments would not expect to be in power long
enough to endure the consequences of the expropriations.
However, I was unsure whether democracy would increase or de-
crease risk. On the one hand, it might increase risk because
people might pressure the government to take property in times
of economic hardship. On the other hand, democracy might
diminish risk because it might cause the government to move
more slowly.
In order to test the hypothesis that these sea changes in
power caused the massive increase in risk, I examined the rela-
tionships between democracy, regime durability, and political
risk (actual and perceived). Then, upon finding that regime du-
rability affects political risk, I analyzed trends in regime durabil-
ity. The results indicate that immediately after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, regimes became much less durable and this
contributed to the sharp increase in risk. Democracy had no net
effect on risk.
Table 2 shows two fixed-effects panel analyses. The first de-
pendent variable is the Euromoney political risk perception in-
dex. The second dependent variable is ICSID Claims/BITs.
The independent variables are: regime durability, level of de-
mocracy, and GDP per capita. GDP per capita is a useful control
variable because wealthy countries may be more able to with-
stand periods of slow economic growth without expropriation.
Regime durability is measured by the number of years since the
most recent regime change. Level of democracy represents a
scale of -10 to 10, where 10 is the most democratic and -10 is
the most autocratic. The regime durability and democracy vari-
ables are borrowed from the Polity IV dataset. I controlled for
GDP per capita (constant year US$2000), and expected that po-
litical risk would diminish as country wealth increased.
The data indicate that regime durability is positively and sig-
nificantly related to perceived political safety and negatively cor-
related with the number of ICSID Claims/BITs. These results
2007]
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indicate that a one year increase in the age of the regime raises
investor confidence by about .103 on the zero to twenty-five
Euromoney political risk scale. A one year increase in the age of
the regime corresponds to a decrease in Claims/BITs of -.00026,
which is substantively significant given that the values of this vari-
able only range from zero to about .25. These coefficients are
also significant in light of the range of regime durability values,
from 0 to 194.
TABLE 2: DURABILITY AND DEMOCRACY
Independent Variables
1 87
Regime Level of GDP
Durability I Democracy Per Capita
Dependent
Variables
Euromoney 0.1026092*** 0.0527805*** 0.0555548***
Perceived
Safety 0.1026092*** 0.0527805*** 0.0555548***
ICSID Claims/ -0.0002645* 0.000194 6.41E-07
Number of
BITs
Increased democracy levels were also positively correlated
with perceived political safety at highly statistically significant
levels. However, democracy levels were not significantly corre-
lated with ICSID Claims/BITs. The effect of democracy on per-
ceived political risk, while statistically significant is not substan-
tively significant in light of the range of democracy values. A
one unit increase in the democracy score corresponds to a .053
unit increase in perceived safety. Since the democracy variable
ranges only from -10 to 10, even a radical change in democracy
level will not affect perceived risk substantially. Table 2 shows
that the previously discussed positive and negative effects of de-
mocracy on political risk balance out, yielding no net effect.
Wealthier countries were perceived as less risky. However,
GDP per capita had no significant effect on ICSID Claims/BITs,
indicating that once regime durability is controlled, level of eco-
nomic development does not increase safety. The effect of GDP
per capita on perceived political risk is substantively significant.
187. In the tables that follow, significance of the results are indicated as follows:
* indicates that the result is significant to the .90 level; ** indicates that the result is
significant to the .95 level. *** indicates that the result is significant to the .99 level.
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A one unit increase in GDP per capita corresponded to an in-
crease of .056 on the perceived political risk scale. GDP per cap-
ita consists of GDP in constant US$2000 divided by population.
Therefore, an increase in GDP per capita of only US$20 would
positively affect perceptions of political risk by one point on the
25 point scale. This is a huge affect, and since it does not appear
in the Claims/BITs analysis, it is possible that investors are mis-
perceiving wealthier countries as being safer than they are.
Now that we have identified that regime durability plays an
important role in affecting risk, and that democracy and regime
durability are important factors affecting perceived political risk,
we must ask whether regime durability and democracy under-
went radical changes in the 1990s period. If so, it is likely that
the dissolution of the Soviet Union caused a power vacuum in
the 1990s.
FIGURE 12: MEAN OF REGIME DURABILITY
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Figure 12 shows average regime durability for all countries
in the world from 1960-2004. Notably, regime stability appears
to be on a constant increasing trend until about 1990. This
means that regime stability may not be a good predictor of the
political risk of the 1970s, but became an important predictor of
expropriations and other political risks during the 1990s.
Figure 13 shows average world democracy levels over time.
The average level of democracy was falling during the 1960s,
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fluctuated in the 1970s, and then rose steadily during the 1980s.
In the early 1990s, it rose dramatically, dipping slightly in the
mid-1990s before rising steadily once again. Predictably, the
high levels of growth in democracy correspond in time with in-
creased ICSID Claims/BITs and increased media coverage.
Therefore, looking only at the graph might lead one to believe
that democracy increased risk. However, the periods of rapid
growth in democracy also correspond to periods of low regime
stability and the regression equation has diagnosed the true
cause of political risk as being regime instability.
FIGURE 13: MEAN OF WORLD DEMOCRACY
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2. Evaluating Industry Affects
The beginning of this Article referenced a newspaper article
regarding expropriation of oil interests in Russia. The article hy-
pothesized that the government's actions were driven by its be-
lief that it had sold the oil interests at unacceptably low prices.
In the privatization period following Soviet dissolution, countries
may have sold facilities on terms that they later came to regret,
prompting us to ask whether certain industries subsequently be-
came more vulnerable. In addition, this inquiry is necessary be-
cause previous literature noted that risks were higher in natural
resource industries.
Surprisingly, Table 3 shows that economies focused on in-
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dustry were perceived as being less safe, while fuel and agricul-
ture had no affect on perceptions. However, the correspon-
dence between Industry as a percentage of GDP and perceived
risk was slight. In order to accomplish even a one unit change in
Euromoney risk rating would require a change in industry per-
centage of about 20%.
TABLE 3: SHORT TERM INDUSTRY TEMPTATION
Independent Variables
Fuel Exports Industry % Agriculture GDP Per
% GDP GDP Exports % Capita
GDP
Dependent
Variables
Euromoney -0.0157115 -0.0498639** -0.0073323 0.000823***
Perceived
Safety
ICSID Claims/ 0.0004421*** 0.0002868 0.0001588 5.75E-07
Number of
BITs
Corporate Tax -0.0445666** -0.0862528* -0.0336998 -1.03E-05
Change from
Previous Year
As expected, economies focused on fuel had higher levels of
ICSID claims than those that were focused on industry and agri-
culture. This effect is not very significant since obtaining change
in the Claims/BIT ratio of .1 would require an increase of over
200% in the "Fuel Exports % GDP" variable.
However, investors in countries with substantial fuel exports
face diminished risk of changes in tax laws. A one unit increase
in fuel exports as a percent of GDP only corresponds to a de-
crease of .0446 in the change in the highest marginal corporate
tax rate.
This may be because many governments that contracted to
privatize formerly government run facilities agreed to restraints
on changes in taxes. Those that violated the agreements some-
times instituted arbitral proceedings before ICSID. The in-
creased risk in this industry is not surprising given the policies of
many countries in the early 1990s to privatize state run facilities.
In some ICSID claims, opposition to privatization formed and
the government took adverse measures amounting to expropria-
tion.
Figure 14 shows that trade in fuel declined after about 1980,
2007] 269
270 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.31:230
FIGURE 14: FUEL EXPORTS AS % GDP (AVERAGE FOR
THE WORLD)
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presumably because of the oil cartels. This trend leveled off
since the late 1990s with a brief increase in 2000. However, this
trend does not seem to correspond with the increased political
risk periods.
Table 4 shows a simple cross-tabulation of the types of OPIC
claims by industry. There was only one claim for compensation
in the financial industry and that was for inconvertibility. The
two construction claims were for contractually related disputes.
About half of the extraction and farming industry claims were
for expropriation, and the other half for political violence.
There was only one claim for inconvertibility in the extraction
industry and only one claim in farming. Manufacturing interests
were much less likely to make claims for expropriation than for
inconvertibility and political violence. These results support the
Kobrin hypothesis that governments are less likely to expropriate
manufacturing interests. However, the manufacturing interests
are more likely to either be the target of political violence or
simply happen to be damaged in episodes of unrest. Manufac-
turing interests were also more likely to encounter difficulties in
repatriating profits, possibly because governments wanted to
keep profits local to appease local interests.
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TABLE 4: OPIC TABULATION OF CLAIM TYPE BY INDUSTRY
Claim Type
Industry I Dispute Exprop. Inconv. Pol. Viol. I Total
Finance 0 1. 1 0 2
Construction 2 0 0 0 2
Extraction 0 2 1 3 6
Farming 0 4 1 5 10
Manufacture 0 4 11 10 25
Total I 2 11 14 18 I 45
Table 5 shows the corresponding results for the ICSID
claims data. Because there were more observations in the ICSID
dataset, this table separates out the expropriations that were
creeping from those that were not. In addition, it is important
to note that the definition for political violence is very different
in the ICSID data. Here, it refers to instances of political vio-
lence for which the government is considered legally responsible
because it directly caused the loss or because it deliberately
failed to afford protection to the facilities. There were very few
instances of this type of political violence. There were also very
few instances of currency inconvertibility. Creeping expropria-
tion was the biggest threat for the construction and extraction
industries. Outright expropriation was the biggest threat in the
financial industries, followed by inconvertibility. The manufac-
turing sector suffered about equally from creeping and outright
expropriation, but also was fairly likely to have disputes with the
government and episodes of political violence. The telecommu-
nications sectors and utilities were most likely to be affected by
TABLE 5: ICSID TABULATION OF CLAIM TYPE BY INDUSTRY
Dispute Code
Industry I Dispute Exprop. Creep. Inconv. Pol. Viol. I Total
Construction 3 2 4 0 0 9
Extraction 4 3 11 0 0 18
Farming 0 1 0 1 0 2
Finance 1 4 0 1 0 6
Manufacture 4 9 10 0 2 25
Services 2 3 1 0 0 6
Telecommunications 0 0 2 0 0 2
Tourism 0 3 0 0 0 3
Utility 0 1 2 0 0 3
Total I 14 26 30 2 2 174
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creeping expropriation. Services and tourism industries such as
hotels and resorts were most affected by outright expropriation.
This Section has shown that the data support the framework
of analysis described in Part I of this Article. Following the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union, regime durability in the world de-
clined. The data strongly support the hypothesis that reductions
in regime durability cause increased risk to investments.
The data also suggest that while countries are strategic in
taking adverse action, they are also constrained by their own po-
litical structures. Therefore, while democracy may increase po-
litical pressure on the government to take adverse action, it
might also constrain the government in taking any action be-
cause of coordination issues and the number of veto players.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CURRENT WORLD POWER
STRUCTURE PROTECTING INVESTMENTS
Before the 1990s, investors had already begun developing
their own legal rules and systems for administering those rules.
The 1990s saw a rapid acceleration of these efforts. Govern-
ments became even more involved with the development, dis-
semination, and enforcement of these laws through the use of
BITs. Instead of military intervention, governments have
brokered international agreements that allow for satisfaction of
awards and judgments through host country property located
outside the host country. The following is a brief discussion of
how sovereigns are now able to provide enforcement without
military intervention.
A. Satisfaction of Awards With Property Outside the Host Country
The effectiveness of investment treaties depends on the
maintenance of assets of a host state outside of that host state.
This condition is generally easily satisfied because states fre-
quently maintain assets outside of their borders. These assets
are subject to the laws of the jurisdictions wherein they are situ-
ated, and courts will take possession of those assets and award
them to those with valid claims against a host state government.
For example, in People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea v. At-
lantic Triton Company, while the arbitral proceedings were ongo-
ing and before any award was granted, Atlantic petitioned the
Commercial Court of Quimper for the attachment of three fish-
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ing vessels registered under the Minister of Fisheries of the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea that were being repaired
in a French shipyard. 88 Attachment of the vessels would prevent
the government of Guinea from disposing of the vessels during
the course of the proceedings and ensure that there would be
funds with which to satisfy an award.189 The issue of whether the
assets could be attached even before the issuance of an award
went up to the Cour de Cassation. The Cour de Cassation ruled
that Atlantic could seek attachment to protect its interests even
though the case was proceeding in arbitration instead of in the
French court system.190
Investors are best able to use this system by shopping for the
best laws and legal systems. This involves inserting forum selec-
tion clauses in their contracts and clauses that select the substan-
tive law to be applied to the contract. The key with respect to
forum selection is to choose a country that will uphold the fo-
rum selection clause and to make sure that the country where
the assets are located will recognize the validity of the award.
This power allows the forum sovereign to be able to give the
investor a remedy, without the involvement of the host state.
International law increasingly respects these contractual
choices of the investors, and gives less deference to host state
objections. For example, in Compagnie d'Enterprises CE, SA v. Re-
public of Yemen, the Yemen Port Authority had entered into a
contract with Compagnie d'Enterprises.' 9 ' A dispute arose after
local authorities froze Compagnie's assets for a period of time
following civil unrest.1 92 Compagnie sought to recover damages
from having its assets frozen. Pursuant to the contract, it submit-
ted the dispute for arbitration in the International Chamber of
Commerce, and the forum was Cyprus.' 9' After the panel deter-
mined that it had jurisdiction, the Port Authority obtained an
anti-suit injunction from a court in Yemen.1 94 However, the arbi-
trator did not recognize this injunction as valid because only a
188. People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea v. Ad. Triton Co., 3 ICSID (W.
Bank) 10 (1984).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Compagnie d'Enterprises CFE, SA v. Republic of Yemen, 180 F. Supp. 2d 12,
13 (D.D.C. 2001).
192. See id. at 13.
193. See id. at 13-14.
194. See id. at 14.
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court in Cyprus had the authority to issue such an order. The
panel continued with the proceedings, and the government of
Yemen sought to have a court in Cyprus issue a similar order,
which it refused to do.
195
When Compagnie brought suit in the United States to en-
force the judgment using assets located in the United States, the
District Court of the District of Columbia entered judgment for
Compagnie in accordance with the arbitral ruling. 196 First, it
stated that Compagnie had a right to seek enforcement of the
award in the United States pursuant to the New York Conven-
tion. It then acknowledged that under the Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act, "no federal district court shall enter default judgment
against a foreign state unless the claimant establishes its right to
relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. ' 1 9 7 In entering judg-
ment for Compagnie, the court found that Compagnie had met
its burden because: "(1) it filed certified copies of the parties'
arbitration agreement and the underlying arbitral award, which
is final, conclusive, and binding under the laws of Cyprus, the
jurisdiction in which the award was rendered; and (2) it followed
the procedures for recognition and confirmation of the award
set forth in the New York Convention and the [Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act ("FSIA")]. ' ' This was all Compagnie
needed to do to invoke the power of the U.S. court system in
aiding its recovery. Accordingly, since Yemen had assets in the
United States, the United States had jurisdiction over those as-
sets and could enforce the award for Compagnie.
Another example of this is the case of Westland Helicopters
Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization. The Arab Organiza-
tion for Industrialization ("AOI") was formed by Egypt, the
United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The AOI entered into a con-
tract with Westland for the purchase of helicopters, but refused
to continue with the contract following the Camp David Ac-
cords.199 The dispute was submitted for arbitration in the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, which, in 1993, entered an
award against AOI for US$385 million, and against Westland for
195. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority, and International Investment Law, 20 AM.
U. INT'L L. REv. 465, 490-92 (2005).
196. See Compagnie d'Enterprises, 180 F. Supp. at 14.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Cheng, supra note 195, at 513.
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US$30 million. U.S., French, and English courts then agreed to
enforce the award against the foreign assets of AOI and its Mem-
ber States.2 ° °
Tribunals may even punish host states for attempting to en-
join the arbitral proceedings. In Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of
Indonesia, and Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indo-
nesia, tribunals found that Indonesian courts had denied justice
to Amco, and ordered the Republic to compensate Amco for the
Indonesian court injunction that had sought to suspend the arbi-
tral proceedings.20 '
In this manner, investors are able to obtain the best of both
worlds. They are frequently able to create their own rules for
solving disputes, select the arbitrators that they believe are the
most competent, and get the benefit of enforcement from po-
tentially any country in which the host state has assets. However,
since international relations might suffer by the taking of the
property of host states to satisfy awards, it is not done without the
host state's agreement. The following Section discusses the pro-
cess by which the host state's agreement is obtained.
B. Countries Use Bilateral Investment Treaties to Compete
For Investment
While Kant wrote that effective and controlled governance
can be obtained by pitting forces within a government against
one another, the new law merchant allows investors, recipients
of investment, and governments to choose the institutions that
will govern them. Where governments choose institutions that
are less effective, the cost of investment in that country will go
up, and investment will decline.
BITs serve as a signaling mechanism to investors regarding
which countries are safer than others. Ten percent of the manu-
facturing companies and sixteen percent of the companies in
the services sector surveyed in the World Bank Group/Multilat-
eral Investment Gurantee Agency ("MIGA") Foreign Direct In-
vestment Survey reported that the existence of a bilateral invest-
ment treaty greatly influenced them in deciding where to in-
200. See id.
201. See Amco Asia Corp. Republic of Indonesia, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 389 (1993);
Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia, 25 ICCA Yearbook of
Comm. Arb. 109-215 (2000); see also Cheng, supra note 195, at 508-09.
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vest.202 Several home countries have drafted model BITs, which
serve as a starting point in negotiations with other countries.
The U.S. Model BIT is a particularly important example of these
increasingly popular instruments because of the amount of FDI
inflow and outflow of the United States, and the number of BITs
of which the United States is a party.
Host countries often have mixed opinions about the bene-
fits of BITs. On the one hand, BITs may attract increased invest-
ment. However, some find it offensive that BITs and multilateral
investment treaties may confer more extensive protections to
foreign investors than the nationals of a host country enjoy.2 °3
In the past, many countries have declined to grant these in-
creased protections for foreigners. For example, for several de-
cades, Latin American states followed the Calvo Doctrine,
whereby foreign investors were entitled to no greater protection
than nationals.2 °4 The Calvo Doctrine was adopted at a time
when Latin American countries still feared European military in-
tervention. However, since this threat has subsided, many Latin
American countries have decided that the benefits of BITs do
now exceed the costs.2 05
When host countries have been reluctant to sign BITs,
home countries sometimes provide additional incentives. For
example, some home countries, such as Germany and France,
only provide investment insurance for investments in countries
with whom they have BITs. 2 6 Notably, this mechanism provides
a benefit to home country investors that may actually be at the
expense of other home country interests.
LDCs may also have become more needful of FDI because
of the fall in aid from the United States. Aid as a share of capital
flows from developed to developing countries fell during the
1980s and 1990s by over 20%. This led to an overall fall in capi-
tal flows. 20 v Commercial bank lending also fell during the 1980s
because of the banking crisis.20 The combination of these fac-
202. See WORLD BANK/MIGA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT SURVEY app. 2, at VII
(2002), available at http://www.miga.org/miga documents/FDlsurvey.pdf.
203. See Garcia, supra note 171, at 310.
204. See id. at 319.
205. See COE, supra note 157, at 350.
206. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INvESTMENT TREATIES 13
(1995).
207. See Ramamurti, supra note 96, at 30.
208. See id.
2007] FILLING THE VOID 277
tors has provided an incentive for LDCs to sign BITs in order to
compete for investment, and the number of BITs they sign may
indicate a "bidding contest." The figures and discussion below
indicate competition to sign not only BITs, but to enact new for-
eign direct investment laws, new arbitration laws, and to become
parties to international conventions.
Figure 15 shows the number of bilateral investment treaties
that states entered between 1959 and 2004. This data was col-
lected from ICSID and UNCTAD, which maintains a list of bilat-
eral investment treaties and the dates on which they were en-
tered.209 Prior to the mid-1980s, countries did not tend to enter
into bilateral investment treaties. However, during the mid-
1980s through the mid-1990s, countries rushed to create interna-
tional law to govern investment, and promised to enforce it. The
number of BITs signed in the 1990s through 2004 has leveled
off, but remains high.
FIGURE 15: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
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Additional evidence of the competition for investment
through international commitments has been in the signing of
the New York Convention. While the New York Convention was
created in 1958, more countries signed it in the 1990s than at
any other time. From 1958 to 1969, the average number of new
209. See International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/treaties.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 15, 2007).
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yearly signatories was 3.09. In the next decade, the average was
2. In the 1980s, the average was 2.5, and in the 1990 to 2002
period, the average was 4.08.210 Similarly, the number of con-
tracting states in the ICSID Convention grew dramatically during
the 1990s. In the initial period from the inception of the ICSID
Convention in 1966 to 1969, an average of thirteen states signed
the convention each year. The average then fell between 1970
and 1979 to 2.3 states per year and fell between 1980 and 1989 to
1.6 states per year. However, this trend reversed during the
1990s, when the average rose to four states per year, before de-
clining again to 2.2 states per year in the 2000 to 2004 period.211
Competition for investment also required the adoption of
national arbitration laws. Figure 16 displays the number of na-
tional arbitration laws passed by countries around the world
from the late 1800s to 2003. The data were collected from
Kluwer Law, which tracks arbitral law passage in countries world-
wide. In some cases, a country passed more than one law in a
given year and each law was separately counted. However, in
most instances, individual countries did not pass more than two
laws in any given year.
Figure 16 shows that national arbitral laws were almost non-
existent until about 1920, which is when Europe started to lose
its grip on the world. In most years until about 1980, no coun-
tries passed any arbitral laws. After 1980, the number of laws per
year dramatically increased. The number peaked in the mid-
1990s before declining somewhat.
2 12
210. See Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, List of
Contracting States in January 2003, http://www.chamber.se/arbitration/english/laws/
1958_NewYorkConvention.2003.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
211. Data was obtained from The International Centre for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes, List of Contracting States and other Signatories of the Convention,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited Sept. 15 2007).
212. See Kluwer Law International, National Laws, http://www.kluwerarbitration.
com/arbitration/toc.aspx?type=legislation&subtype=National+Laws (last visited Sept.
15, 2007).
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FIGURE 16: ARBITRATION LAWS
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Figure 17 shows the number of key FDI laws listed by
UNCTAD in its World Investment Report. These data also indi-
cate a spike in activity in the mid-1990s. While the UNCTAD list
is not exhaustive of the total number of laws and does not indi-
cate the level of favorability to investors of those laws, the race
for FDI in the 1990s indicates that much of this activity has been
meant to foster FDI.
What all of these figures show is that countries engaged in a
flurry of activity to formalize protections for international inves-
tors in an effort to compete for international investment. Home
countries were also very active in promoting the formalization of
protection and encouraging host countries to pre-commit to
protecting foreign investments.
If host countries enact BITs and other laws to protect inves-
tors, they could be said to want to give increased assurances to
investors. However, they may also simply be formalizing protec-
tion that they have already afforded investors. To determine
what causes real and perceived change in protection through
changes in laws and legal structures, I collected data on the
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number of BITs in force in each year, the number of domestic
arbitration laws, and the number of key laws regulating FDI
listed by UNCTAD.
Table 6 shows that regime durability positively affects the
number of BITS, the number of domestic arbitration laws, and
the number of FDI laws listed by UNCTAD. This is expected
because regimes with more durability value the future more and
are more interested in cultivating future investment. In addi-
tion, they are more capable of enacting laws because there is less
disruption to the law making process. This result is not surpris-
ing in light of the earlier results indicating that political risk is
inversely related to regime stability. Therefore, while BITs could
increase protections in regimes that are less stable, it is also likely
that they merely formalize the protections already inherent in
stable regimes.
TABLE 6: CA USES OF INCREASED FORMAL PROTECTIONS
Dependent Variables
Number of Number of Number of FDI
BITs Domestic Laws Listed by
Arbitration UNCTAD
Laws
Independent
Variables
Regime 1.466734*** 0.0501683*** 0.119405***
Durability
Democracy 1.428689*** 0.0764183*** 0.198153***
Level
Fuel Exports -0.0208003 -0.0140683*** -0.02449*
% GDP
FDI % GDP 0.6047966*** 0.0288318** 0.180645***
GDP Per 0.0015329*** 0.000281*** 0.000453***
Capita
A more interesting result is that democracies seek to impose
more legal constraints on themselves and thereby foster invest-
ment. Previous results showed that the level of democracy had
no affect on political risk, which could have been due to a bal-
ancing of political pressures and veto players. The results in Ta-
ble 6 show that democracies are seeking to further constrain
themselves with respect to investments. This makes sense be-
cause the benefit of the constraint is immediate, in that investors
will invest more. However, the cost is deferred and discounted
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since the desire to expropriate a particular investment may not
have yet materialized.
In all three equations, the coefficient for fuel exports is neg-
ative, and it is significant in two of the equations. This indicates
that countries are reluctant to increase protections where the
temptation to take adverse action against investments is high,
supporting the argument that these countries are reluctant to
confer protections through legal structures that do not already
exist.
Lastly, the result for FDI as a percent of GDP is not surpris-
ing. Those countries with great dependence on FDI are more
inclined to give additional assurances to investors, although
these assurances may or may not reflect actual increased protec-
tions.
V. DISCUSSION OF LITERATURE IN LIGHT OF RESULTS
The results discussed above largely comport with the results
of previous studies. This is true because previous results have
substantially focused on the efforts of newly independent coun-
tries to take control of their economies. For example, Kobrin" 3
and Minor"' noted that most expropriations before 1960 were
associated with massive governmental upheaval, and Gordon" 5
and Kobrin 216 link these episodes with the establishment of na-
tional sovereignty. Eaton & Gersovitz 217 argue that even later,
more targeted episodes represented consolidations of national
power. These results support my hypothesis because these are
all directly related to declarations of independence from former
controlling powers.
Jodice 2 1 and Ramamurti21 9 note with surprise that former
colonizers were the least at risk in their former colonies. This
result is not surprising when viewed in the context of my hypoth-
esis regarding repeated transactions because, after indepen-
dence, without external governmental force to protect invest-
ments, investors had to rely on repeated dealing. Former colo-
213. See Kobrin, supra note 86, at 69 (1980).
214. See Minor, supra note 6, at 184.
215. See GORDON, supra note 85, at 4.
216. See Kobrin, supra note 86, at 69.
217. See Eaton & Gersovitz, supra note 91, at 39.
218. SeeJodice, supra note 91, at 185.
219. See Ramamurti, supra note 96, at 27.
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nizers are likely to have had the best investment infrastructure
and business contacts to foster these repeated deals. In addition,
certain businesses may not have been able to survive without for-
eign management. Therefore, these substantial and repeated
transactions provided incentives for host country cooperation.
Previous research also supports my theory that home coun-
tries became involved in the provision of incentives. For exam-
ple, Ramamurti220 notes that countries were less likely to expro-
priate when they were recipients of foreign aid. In addition,
home countries became increasingly involved with investor pro-
tection and access, linking a substantial amount of FDI and capi-
tal bailout money to privatization efforts.221
While scholars have tended to attribute these results merely
to host country characteristics and circumstances, I believe that a
look behind these results supports the conclusion that one of
the main underlying causes of political risk is change in external
pressure.
CONCLUSION
This Article has gathered evidence that supports the hy-
pothesis that factors external to host countries greatly affect po-
litical risk within host countries. In many situations, host coun-
tries refrain from taking property because of external pressure.
The world becomes a riskier place when there are changes in the
degree or character of the external pressure exerted. Usually,
the change begins with the decline of one source of pressure,
which is followed by an increase in risk, and ends with the rise of
a new mechanism for exerting pressure. This research repre-
sents an advance over prior research, which focused on host
country factors without noting external political situations.
Because a decline in external pressure can increase risk, in-
vestors have substantial incentives to foster new methods of host
country control, with previous forms ranging from reputational
pressure to colonialism. While governmental and perhaps mili-
tary force is often the preferred method of exerting this pres-
sure, investors have managed their own institutions, often work-
ing in concert with home governments.
Finally, this Article discussed the current method of exert-
220. See id. at 30.
221. See id. at 32.
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ing external pressure. Since the early 1990s, there has been a
proliferation of legal structures such as ICSID, investment trea-
ties, and domestic laws to foster foreign direct investment. In-
vestment treaties ask that countries consent to having their prop-
erty abroad used to satisfy judgments and awards issued against
them. Because these agreements foster investment, govern-
ments enter them and, when a taking occurs, the property
abroad can be used if necessary. While in previous periods, in-
vestment has involved the use of force by home states, in the
current period, home state force can be used without military
intervention in the host state.

